Abstract-Trusted computing platforms have been proposed as a promising approach to enhance the security of general-purpose computing systems. Direct Anonymous Attestation(DAA) is a scheme that allows a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which is the core component of the trusted computing platform to remotely convince a communication partner that it is indeed a Trusted Platform Module while preserving the user's privacy. The first DAA scheme developed by Brickell which is relatively complex and time-consuming was adopted by the current TPM specification.As the ECC cryptosystem is more efficient compared to the RSA cryptosystem, more and more cryptographic device is based on the ECC cryptosystem, so it is anticipated that the TPM will be based on the ECC in near future. In this paper, we propose a new direct anonymous attestation which is suitable for the ECC-based TPM. This paper presents an efficient construction that implements all anonymous authentication features specified in DAA. The proposed scheme has the best computational performance of all the DAA schemes up to now. The new DAA scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the q-SDH and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Direct Anonymous Attestation(DAA) is a scheme developed by Brickell,Camenisch,and Chen [2] which we refer to as the BCC scheme in this paper for remote authentication of a security hardware module,called Trusted Platform Module(TPM),while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. The scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group(TCG) [7] ,an non-profit standardization body that aims to develop and promote an open industry standard for trusted computing hardware and software building blocks, and was included in TPM specification version 1.2. According to the TPM specification, the current BCC implementation is based on the RSA cryptosystem whose computation is based on the modular exponentiations, modular squarings and multiplications. One limitation of the original BCC scheme is that the lengths of private keys and DAA signatures are quite large for a small TPM, i.e., around 670 bytes and 2800 bytes, respectively.It is inappropriate for mobile platform adopt the BCC scheme. Unlike desktop computers, mobile devices have very stringent limitations with respect to available power, physical circuit area, and cost. So, In PKC2007 conference,He Ge and Stephen R.Tate proposed a new DAA scheme [3] which we refer to as the HS scheme for devices with low computing capabilities,such as cell phones. All the two DAA schemes are suitable for RSA-based TPM which implement the modular squaring and multiplication operations; the security of all the two DAA schemes are based on strong RSA assumption and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
According to [5] , Elliptic curve cryptography is more efficient than integer factorization systems and discrete logarithm systems in terms of key sizes and bandwidth for schemes of relative security. This feature make it especially attractive for next generation TPM. There are two reasons that in near future, it is necessary to design a new ECC-based TPM architecture:
1、The current encryption and decryption scheme is based on RSA-systems,compared to the ECC cryptosystem,the RSA-based system's efficiency is relatively poor, more and more cryptosystems are based on eclipse curves, Meanwhile under the same security level, the ECC cryptosystem has shorter key length.
2 、 In current TPM implementation, the BCC scheme is adopted as the privacy solution, but the BCC scheme is so complex and time-consuming that it is very difficult to deploy the BCC scheme. Also because of the complexity of the BCC scheme. it is not proper to implement the BCC scheme in mobile computing platform, so it is necessary design a new efficient direct anonymous scheme that can be implemented also in mobile platform.
In this paper, we give a new direct anonymous scheme based on bilinear maps. The new practical DAA scheme has the best performance and the shortest signature length up to now.Our construction is built up from the signature scheme due to short signature scheme [1] [4] . As our DAA scheme is based on the ECC cryptography, it is more efficient than the traditional DAA scheme which is based on the RSA cryptosystem like BCC scheme and HS scheme,we will demonstrate this point in Section IV when we present performance analysis. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Firstly in section II describe the related work about DAA schemes, then we define our notations and briefly review some previously known cryptographic techniques in SectionШ. After that we describe our schemes in Section IV, Finally We conclude this paper in section V.
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II. RELATED WORK
After the BCC scheme was adopted as privacy solution for trusted computing platform, there have been several different papers discussing the deficiency and extensions of the BCC scheme. In order to provide the same privacy level as Privacy CA scheme, Jan Camenisch propose a scheme based on the BCC scheme which using a two stage authorization [10] . In original BCC scheme,a TPM can be revoked only if the TPM's private key in the hardware has been extracted and published widely.In paper [14] ,the authors present a new scheme which provides a method to revoke a TPM even if the TPM private key is unknown as in BCC scheme.
Meanwhile, researches on application of the DAA scheme are going on. The paper [16] provides a mechanism to insure that credentials can only be used with the TPM it got issued to. In P2P systems, We can employ the functionalities provided by trusted computing technology to establish a pseudonymous authentication scheme for peers and extend this scheme to build secure channels between peers for future communications [17] . The paper [18] demonstrates how Single Sign On among disparate service providers can be achieved using TCGconformant computing platforms. Ernie Brickell proposed a direct anonymous attestation based on bilinear maps [22] .This scheme which we refer to as the BCL scheme is the first DAA scheme which is based on the bilinear maps.
Ш [21] for various proofs of knowledge of discrete logarithms and proofs of the validity of statements about discrete logarithms. oracle model, such protocols can be turned into signature schemes using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [8] We use the notation to denote a signature obtained in this way.
IV THE NEW DIRECT ANONYMOUS ATTESTATION

A. The Security Model
This section introduces the model for direct anonymous attestation, which is a variant of the group signature model.Both these two models support procedures KeyGen, Join,Sign and Verify, while DAA further supports mechanism such as variable linkabiliby and rogue TPM tagging. Definition 1. Direct anonymous attestation is a digital signature scheme with 5-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms(KeyGen,DAA-Join,DAA-Sign,DAAVerify,Rogue tagging):
KeyGen: A probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the security parameter and outputs a pair of group master keys (SK,VK). SK is the user's signing key, which is kept secret, and VK the user's verification key, which is made public. k 1 DAA-Join: An interactive protocol between a TPM and the issuer. The TPM obtains a group membership certificate C to become a group member. DAA-Sign: Using its group membership certificate and private key C sk , the TPM creates an anonymous group signature σ for a message .
DAA-Verify: A signature σ is verified to make sure it originates from a legitimate TPM without knowledge of which particular one. Rogue tagging: A rogue TPM can be identified and excluded for the group. We adopt the security notions and security model in paper [22] , DAA should satisfy the following properties -Unforgeability: Only trusted computing group are able to sign messages on behalf of the group,An adversary,which has corrupted a set of signers' secret keys and their credentials, finds it hard to forge a valid signature under a secret key and credential, which is not in the set.
-Anonymous: It is infeasible to identify the real TPM of a signature unless this TPM is on the revocation list.
-Unlinkability:It is infeasible to link two different signatures of the same TPM if the two basenames are not same and chosen randomly.
B. Key Generation for Issuer
Given security parameters , the Issuer chooses
Such that its order p is of length ，and there exists a pairing maps: ,
= ，then the key pairs for the DAA Issuer is: by using the elliptic curve defined by [9] .We also assume that the representations of and are 1020 bits and 171 bits. , ,
Comparison with previous schemes: We evaluate the signature length and computational complexity of the proposed scheme to those of the previous schemes [2] [3]and [22] We select the security parameter in BCC scheme [2] as follows: and BCL [22] scheme as follows:
512, 160, 80, 256
We list the assumptions required in our scheme and the previous schemes [2, 3, 22] . These results of estimation and required assumptions are given in Table I "ME"，"NP"are abbreviations of "the number of Modular Exponentiations" and "the Number of Pairing". Currently, the most efficient construction which is based on the bilinear maps is the one proposed in [22] . From the above table, We can see that compare to the BCL scheme which is also based on the ECC cryptosystem, our scheme require less pairing computations,the signature length of our scheme is 49% of those of scheme in [22] . The computational cost for our scheme is also smaller than those of scheme in [22] . Finally,our scheme has the shortest signature length of all the schemes..
H. Security Analysis Theorem 1. The direct anonymous attestation is secure under the q-SDH and the decisional DiffieHellman assumption.
We have to show that our scheme satisfies all the security properties listed in Definition 1.
The proposed scheme meet the requirements of Unforgeability ,Anonymity and Unlinkability.We give informal discussion here.A more detailed security proof is give in Appendix A.
Lemma 1(Unforgeability):Only the trusted computing platform which has successfully execute the join process are able to sign messages on behalf of the group which is composed of trusted computing platforms.This is an immediate consequence of the interactive protocol under the signature scheme is zeroknowledge under the random oracle model. were computed by the same trusted computing platform is computationally hard.
I. Implementation
In this section we will prototype the concrete DAA scheme.We investigated our proposed schemes on a Intel dual-core 3.2GHz desktop computers with 1GB RAM running Windows.We used the NTL library [23] , openssl library and the PBC library [13] as the underlying cryptographic libraries.
We design a experiments to evaluate how efficient of the proposed scheme.We prototyped three modules tpm-module,host-module and server-module. The tpmmodule emulates the function of the hardware TPM, the host-module play the part of the Host and the servermodule play the part of the Issuer.
Choices of the ECC curve Supersingular elliptic curves are rather special curves with additional algebraic structure and have, until recently, been regarded as dangerous for use in cryptography, because the extra structure makes them vulnerable to certain specialised attacks. However, whereas standard elliptic curve cryptosystems such as ElGamal encryption or ECDSA can be implemented using randomly generated elliptic curves,the elliptic curves required to implement pairing-based systems must have certain properties that randomly generated elliptic curves are unlikely to have.The supersingular elliptic curves can implement bilinear pairings.
We select the ECC curve. For the groups G and their associated bilinear map, we can use,for example,the elliptic curve proposed by [9] and Tate pairing.We used the supersingular elliptic curve :
The security level of our implementation of pairing assumes that the solution of a discrete logarithm problem over , where p is 512 bits,is as hard as the discrete logarithm problem over where p is 1024 bits and contemporary usage dictates a discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve using points with order where is 160 bits. These problems are as difficult as solving a 1024-bit integer factorization RSA problem. From Table II and Table III , we can see that our new scheme is much more efficient than the original BCC scheme in all steps of the DAA scheme.
V.CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new direct anonymous attestation scheme. We propose a new Direct Anonymous Scheme from the bilinear maps based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption and q-SDH assumption. Compared to other schemes, our scheme cut down the signature length ， bring down the TPM part computational cost in the sign process. Our scheme meet the security requirements of unforgeability,variable anonymity and unlinkability.
APPENDIX A SECURITY PROOF
Lemma 4
Under the DDH assumption, the DAA scheme specified in Section IV is user-controlled anonymous. More specifically, if there is an adversary A that succeeds with a non-negligible probability to break user-controlled anonymity of the scheme, then there is a simulatorsolves the DDH problem with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: The security proof is very similar with the proof in paper [22] .We will show how an adversary A that succeeds with a non-negligible probability to break usercontrolled anonymity of the DAA scheme may be used to construct a simulator S that solves the DDH problem. Simulator: Join(ID). At the beginning of the simulation choose α,β uniformly at random.We show how to respond to the i-th query made by A below. Note that we assume A does not make repeat queries. should have been asked for the Corrupt query and the Sign query with the same SSID≠⊥ by following the definition of the game defined in Section 2.2 of the paper [22] .
S chooses a bit b at random, and generates the challenge by querying if b = 0 otherwise in the same way as Case 2 of the Sign query simulation. S returns the result σ to A. Lemma 2 Under the SDH assumption, the DAA scheme specified in Section IV is user-controlledtraceable. More specifically, if there is an adversary A that succeeds with a non-negligible probability to break user-controlled-traceability of the scheme, then there is a simulator S running in polynomial time that solves the SDH problem with a non-negligible probability.
Proof: This Theorem can be concluded from the theorem 1 of the paper [1] .
